Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 34, Issue 1

2010

Article 4

T WENTY-F IRST A NNUAL P HILIP D. R EED M EMORIAL I SSUE

Working Toward a Legally Enforceable
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
Ronald J. Sievert∗

∗

Copyright c 2010 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Working Toward a Legally Enforceable
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
Ronald J. Sievert

Abstract
The foundation of the international effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (”NPT”). This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I proposes
a new Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Part II contains preliminary observations regarding the
Security Council, General Assembly and Zanger Committee provisions of the new treaty and then
addresses the basic question of why nations might be willing to scrap the established NPT in favor
of this new proposed agreement. Finally, Part III discusses how the advent of international institutions and the increasing incorporation of international law into the framework of domestic, regional
and international tribunals may enhance the enforcement of the proposed non-proliferation treaty.

WORKING TOWARD A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
Ronald J. Sievert*
INTRODUCTION
An Honest Appraisal of the Ability to Legally Enforce the Apparent
Commitments Made by the 1968 NPT
The foundation of the international effort to stop the
proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (“NPT”).1 To be legally enforceable, however, a treaty
must contain provisions that can be realistically achieved by the
parties.2 Accordingly, in an effort to determine if the current
NPT is enforceable, the first step must be to objectively analyze
the wording of the treaty to determine if it contains reasonable
objectives.
There has been some debate in recent years over the actual
meaning of the key provisions of the NPT. The non-nuclear
weapons states (“NNWS”) maintain that, in essence, the
“bargain” reflected in the treaty is that they will refrain from
obtaining or developing nuclear weapons in return for assistance
in acquiring peaceful nuclear energy and a promise that the
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US Department of Energy to the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute
(“NSSPI”), Texas Engineering Experiment Station at Texas A&M University. Any
opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication,
however, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US
Department of Energy. The author would like to thank Dr. Paul Nelson of NSSPI at
Texas A&M for his substantial assistance with this Article.
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
2. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 61–62, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]. The United States has not ratified the
VCLT, but it has been ratified or adopted by 110 nations, and it is generally regarded as
customary international law for all states.
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nuclear weapons states (“NWS”) will completely disarm.3
Conservative advocates for the NWS, on the other hand,
emphasize that the treaty only requires, on their part, a cessation
of the arms race and a good faith effort at disarmament (with the
possibility of even preserving some nuclear capability as a
necessary hedge against aggressor states).4 Such good faith efforts
could, theoretically, continue in perpetuity, but the fact that they
have not achieved the ultimate goal of weapons elimination does
not, in their opinion, in any way relieve the NNWS of their
obligation not to engage in proliferation.5
Legally, treaties, as contracts, are interpreted by looking at
the ordinary meaning of the language with a supplementary
reference to the surrounding statements of the parties when the
language is somewhat ambiguous.6 Application of these basic
rules demonstrates that the non-nuclear weapon states have the
better of the argument as to the actual meaning of the NPT. The
preamble to the NPT states the purpose of the treaty is to
facilitate the “elimination from national arsenals of nuclear
weapons . . . pursuant to a treaty on general and complete
disarmament.”7 The treaty itself calls specifically for
“negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating . . . to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament.”8 If there were any question as to the plain
meaning of the words, at least from the perspective of the United
States, it can be settled by resort to the statements of a succession
of US presidents from Presidents Nixon and Reagan to President
Obama as well as their advisors. They have verbally and in writing
embraced the objective of immediate efforts to achieve complete

3. See Adel Ali, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Its Recent Issues:
A Legal Perspective, 1 INT’L J. NUCLEAR L. 305, 307 (2007); see also Chamundeeswari
Kuppuswamy, Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Shaking at Its Foundations? Stock Taking
After the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 141, 142–43 (2006).
4. See Christopher Ford, The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of the
Nonproliferation Regime, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 937, 957–66 (2007); Paul Nelson,
Book Review: Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, 3 ATOMS
FOR PEACE: AN INT’L J. 143, 154 (2010).
5. See Ford, supra note 4, at 960–62; Scott Sagan, Good Faith and Nuclear
Disarmament Negotiations, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE 203, 209–10
(George Perkovich & James M. Acton eds., 2009).
6. See VCLT, supra note 2, arts. 31–32.
7. NPT, supra note 1, pmbl.
8. Id. art. VI.
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nuclear disarmament.9 Former US Secretaries of State Kissinger
and Shultz have noted that the “[NPT] envisioned the end of all
nuclear weapons” and have stated that states should cease
reliance on such weapons.10 US Secretary of State Clinton
proclaimed at the NPT Review Conference on May 3, 2010, “I
represent a President and a country committed to a vision of a
world without nuclear weapons . . . .”11 In the face of such fairly
categorical pronouncements, any argument by the United States
that the existing treaty really only required that it generally work
towards some extremely far off objective of eventual
disarmament rings hollow.
Of course even if a general “good faith” effort was the only
obligation under the treaty, it would be difficult to say that the
United States has met this condition. Legally, “good faith” means
“faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party” and not evading the
spirit of the bargain.12 Based on such actions as the withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (“ABM”) Treaty and failure to
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (“CNTBT”),
many could legitimately argue that the United States has not
engaged in a “good faith” effort.13 This is not to make light of the
thirty-year effort of the United States and USSR, beginning with
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, to reduce their nuclear
arsenals. The elimination of 13,000 nuclear weapons by the
United States is an incredible accomplishment,14 especially
considering that China has presumably increased its stock of
weapons. But however laudable this achievement, it does not
represent a practical commitment by the leaders of either the
United States or Russia to actually abolish nuclear weapons.

9. See, e.g., George P. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan.
4, 2007, at A15 (referencing Presidents Nixon and Reagan’s commitment to a nuclearfree world); Lawrence Wittner, How Feasible is Obama’s Nuclear Disarmament Agenda?,
HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Apr. 20, 2009, http://hnn.us/articles/76303.html (stating that
Carter, Reagan, and Obama all called for “abolishing nuclear weapons”).
10. See Shultz et al., supra note 9, at A15.
11. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Review Conference of the
Nonproliferation Treaty (May 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2010/05/141424.htm).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
13. See, e.g., Sagan, supra note 5, at 207–08.
14. Ford, supra note 4, at 963.
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Given that a possible interpretation of the wording and
contemporary statements surrounding the passage of the NPT
might require, at the very least, immediate efforts to achieve
complete nuclear disarmament, it could even be charged, if the
NPT was a legally enforceable treaty, that the United States,
Russia, and other NWS are now in material breach.15 The Group
of Non-Aligned States party to the NPT certainly seems to believe
that this may be the case. Their Elements for a Plan of Action for
the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, issued April 30, 2010,
begins by citing the “multilaterally agreed commitments [by the
NWS] to achieve general and complete disarmament” and states
that “[t]he NWS need to implement the unequivocal
undertaking that they had provided in 2000 so as to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.”16 The United
States would of course counter a charge of material breach by
stating that its failure to eliminate nuclear weapons was caused by
the refusal of other states to disarm, while they in turn would
blame the United States. Such allegations would, in all
likelihood, dissolve into an endless round of finger-pointing with
no resolution.
But the United States need not fear being forced to defend
itself against charges of material breach of the NPT. This is
because, to the extent the NPT manifestly requires an immediate
attempt to completely abolish nuclear weapons, it has
established, from a legal standpoint, an objective that in the
current state of world affairs is impossible to achieve. A
responsible government cannot disarm knowing that not only
have its traditional adversaries been armed with nuclear
warheads, but smaller unstable states, such as Iran, North Korea,
and Pakistan, and non-state actors, have acquired or are hoping
to obtain such weapons. Furthermore, as a nuclear weapon can
be as small as an artillery shell and hidden in any house, shed, or
cave, every practical world leader knows it is impossible to verify
that a potential adversary has not kept any nuclear weapons in
hiding; in the absence of absolute verification, the leader must be

15. See VCLT, supra note 2, art. 60.
16. INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SEC., ELEMENTS FOR A PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY GROUP OF THE NON-ALIGNED STATE PARTIES TO
NPT
1 (2010),
http://isis-online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/
THE
NAM_Plan_of_Action_for_2010_NPT_RevCon_30April2010.pdf.
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prepared to respond in kind. Secretary of State Clinton
acknowledged this latter reality when she said in her May 3, 2010
speech, “The United States will retain a nuclear deterrent for as
long as nuclear weapons exist.”17 As no one will ever be able to
conclusively prove the nonexistence of nuclear weapons, there
will always have to be a deterrent.
In addition, a solid case can be made that nuclear weapons
have actually continued to prevent major catastrophic wars by,
for example, deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, a
Chinese assault on Taiwan, or attempts by the Arab states to
overrun Israel.18 NWS, like England, France, and the United
States, that might wish to protect themselves and their allies
against attack by larger states are simply not financially capable of
permanently maintaining huge regular armies that can always
deter a highly populous aggressor state by means of conventional
weapons only.
This author noted above that the objectives of the NPT
could not be met “in the current state of world affairs” because
theoretically one could imagine that the threats to security
outlined above could be at least greatly reduced in a utopian
future if all states were united in the creation of a UN that could
actually prevent wars between states. This would require a
Security Council (“SC”) that was not hamstrung by the veto and
had established a record of acting quickly, without endless
debate, to not only prevent aggression but capture and punish
those who initiated aggressive war. Even this newly empowered
ideal UN would need to possess nuclear weapons so as not to be
at the mercy of a rogue state which had managed to conceal a
few of its own. But at least such an organization would provide
the cover that would enable states to disarm. Unfortunately,
there has not been any attempt in the last few decades by the
NWS and the NNWS to create this model international
17. Clinton, supra note 11.
18. See Heewon Han & Jongho Kim, How Hot?, ‘Real’ Hot: Can We Control North
Korean Nuclear Weapons Through International Law? Hints from the International Court of
Justice’s Advisory Opinion, 2 ATOMS FOR PEACE: AN INT’L J. 236, 240 (2009); Nelson, supra
note 4, at 145 (citing Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; More May Be
Better, ADELPHI PAPERS, Autumn 1981). The reference to Waltz is not meant as an
endorsement of the theory that more weapons in the hands of more states is better.
Such a development would contradict the basic principle that it is important to keep
weapons out of the hands of a significant number of leaders.
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organization. Such an organization does not exist and in all
likelihood will not exist in the foreseeable future.
What remains is a real world in which complete nuclear
disarmament is impossible. The promise and hope of no
nuclear weapons in the NPT is a fantasy. Despite the hard
work of the delegates, and a strengthened International
Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), the decision at the 2010
NPT review conference essentially to hold another meeting
later to discuss the Middle East does absolutely nothing to
alter this view.19 These statements are not meant to denigrate
those who advocate the honorable goal of a nuclear free
world. But, in this author’s ideal world, not only would nuclear
weapons be eliminated, but also tanks, artillery, high
explosives, automatic weapons, and many of the other terrible
devices that have repeatedly caused horrific destruction in the
last 500 years. An improvised explosive device or car bomb
exploding next to a group of soldiers and civilians has the
same devastating impact on them as a nuclear explosion ten
miles distant. The world will not be able to completely abolish
nuclear weapons, for the reasons already stated, any more
than it has been able to eliminate “conventional” weapons. In
the history of mankind, no weapon has just disappeared. Their
use generally only diminishes when replaced by a more
fearsome weapon; the clock cannot be turned backwards.
Law generally has a way to accommodate reality. Article 61
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)
provides that a treaty is unenforceable (by means of termination
or withdrawal) based on impossibility of performance if an object
indispensable to the treaty no longer exists.20 Article 62 of the
VCLT states that a treaty may not be enforced if there has been a
fundamental change in essential circumstances.21 If the party
seeking to withdraw has caused the elimination of the object or
the change in circumstances, it is still obligated by the treaty. The
19. See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the
National Security Advisor, General James L. Jones, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/statement-national-security-advisor-general-james-l-jones-non-proliferation-treaty.
20. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 61.
21. Id. art. 62.
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indispensable objects and essential circumstances of the NPT are
(1) the reduction and (2) eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons states with (3) the assistance of a Security Council that
would effectively act in response to reports of violations and
diversion of nuclear materials by the IAEA.22 But the fact is that
the number of nuclear weapons states have expanded since 1968,
not reduced, and the Security Council has repeatedly
demonstrated an inability to prevent more states from acquiring
weapons.
The refusal of some of the original NWS to completely
disarm may have “caused” the other existing nuclear-armed
states to retain their weapons. This did not, however, “cause” the
additional proliferation and attempted acquisition of weapons
that followed. France, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and the USSR, were not serious enemies of India, Iraq, Israel, or
Pakistan prior to 1990, and the major powers did not seriously
threaten the sovereignty of North Korea. The development of
nuclear weapons by four new states since 1968 with relative
alacrity (not including Libya and South Africa which disbanded
their programs), along with the reported efforts of non-state
actors to obtain them, has legally subverted the foundation of the
NPT and made it impossible for the original NWS to eliminate
their own weapons. In addition, the United States and the United
Kingdom, at least, certainly are not responsible for the failure of
the Security Council to prevent proliferation. This body, despite
the end of the Cold War, has been constrained by national selfinterest instead of empowered by the need to insure global
security. Its weakness has been one of the great disappointments
of our time. Regardless, its inability to be effective in the face of
threats of proliferation has also completely undermined one of
the core premises of the NPT. If a NWS were ever to be
challenged before an international tribunal because of its failure
to disarm, it would thus have a very strong legal case that the
1968 treaty simply could not be enforced against that state
because of impossibility of performance and fundamental change
of circumstances.
22. Ben Sanders, A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 62 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 7,
18–19 (1998) (referencing the “basic measures that underpin the non proliferation
regime,” discussing the IAEA safeguards and reporting requirements, and noting that
the Security Council formally took responsibility for non-proliferation in 1992).
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The promise of a world free of nuclear weapons in the NPT
may be utopian, but the goal of no nuclear war is both possible
and real. The way to reach this important objective is to fashion a
legally enforceable non-proliferation treaty and regime that
actually limits the number of leaders who possess nuclear
weapons while providing the NNWS with the civilian energy
many desire.23 President John F. Kennedy’s great concern was a
world in which twenty-five states had nuclear weapons24 because,
of course, the more leaders who have such weapons the greater,
the danger that they may be placed under the control of a Hitler
or genocidal chief of state who has no fear of Armageddon.25
Accordingly, the world needs to work honestly to create a
structure that insures there are “no loose nukes, no nascent
nukes and no new nuclear weapons states.”26 Such a regime,
based on a legally enforceable treaty reflecting twentieth century
progress in international law, can be constructed.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I proposes a new
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Part II contains preliminary
observations regarding the Security Council, General Assembly
(“GA”) and Zanger Committee provisions of the new treaty and
then addresses the basic question of why nations might be willing
to scrap the established NNPT in favor of this new proposed
agreement. Finally, Part III discusses how the advent of
international institutions and the increasing incorporation of
international law into the framework of domestic, regional and
international tribunals may enhance the enforcement of the
proposed non-proliferation treaty.
I.

A PROPOSED NEW TREATY

This section outlines a proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty that is both realistic and enforceable. The reader need not
devote inordinate time to an analysis of every word in the
proposal as it is well recognized that draftsmen and negotiators
would spend hours if not months quibbling over every nuance
and phrase before such a treaty was ever submitted for
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Nelson, supra note 4, at 146.
See Glenn Seaborg, Explosive Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1982, at sec. 7, p. 10.
See Nelson, supra note 4, at 146; see also Han & Kim, supra note 18, at 237.
Kuppuswamy, supra note 3, at 147 (citing GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR
TERRORISM, THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE 140 (2004)).
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ratification. What is important are the concepts. An enforceable
NPT might look something like this:
Article I
Each NWS agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS
or encourage or assist them in the development of nuclear
weapons as outlined in current Article I of the NPT.
Article II
Each NNWS agrees not to receive or manufacture nuclear
weapons as outlined in current Article II of the NPT.
Article III
The parties agree that a committee similar to the current
Nuclear Exporters Committee will be formed to reach a common
understanding on (a) an evolving list of “proscribed material,”
such as equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable
material; and (b) the conditions, procedures, and safeguards that
would govern exports of such equipment or material in order to
meet the obligations of Article IV. Each party agrees to accept
and abide by IAEA safeguards as outlined in current Article III of
the NPT.
Article IV
Each party agrees to facilitate to the fullest extent the
transfer of information and technology for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy as outlined in current Article IV of the NPT. Each
party agrees that “proscribed material” may only be transferred
and received under the conditions, procedures, and safeguards
mandated by the Committee established pursuant to Article III
or the IAEA.
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Article V
The parties recognize that the following states possess
nuclear weapons: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea,
Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States. The parties
agree not to engage in a nuclear arms race as understood in
former Article V of the NPT. Nuclear Weapons States agree not
to utilize nuclear weapons against any other state unless there has
been (1) first use by the other state or a non-state actor assisted
by that state, or (2) the other state has initiated a war of
aggression as that term has been defined by the International
Criminal Court with intent to temporarily or permanently occupy
the territory of a recognized state in violation of the UN Charter.
Article VI
The parties agree that any factual or legal dispute as to
whether a nation is transferring weapons technology, violating
IAEA safeguards, acquiring weapons, refusing to facilitate the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, or otherwise acting in violation of
this treaty shall be first submitted to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in the Hague unless an emergency would not allow
time for arbitration. If arbitration fails, the aggrieved party may
bring the case before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) at
which time the complaining party will have the burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate the other
party is acting in violation of the treaty or appropriate IAEA
safeguards.
Article VII
The parties agree that if the ICJ finds that a party is acting in
violation of the treaty or appropriate safeguards, the ICJ may
order fines, sanctions, or other remedies in accordance with this
treaty that it deems appropriate. The parties agree that any state
upon which fines, sanctions, or other remedies have been
imposed may appeal the findings of the ICJ to the General
Assembly or Security Council which may by majority vote (a)
reverse the court order or (b) increase or modify the fine,
sanctions, and remedies. The order of the ICJ shall be
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considered final if the General Assembly or Security Council has
not taken action within thirty days.
Article VIII
If a party does not comply with the orders of the ICJ,
General Assembly, or Security Council within a reasonable time,
the parties agree that the Security Council may order appropriate
action by majority vote. If a party has violated Articles I, II, or V of
this treaty and the violations threaten international peace and
security, the parties agree that the Security Council may order
military action as deemed necessary if such action is authorized
by a vote of at least ninety percent of the sitting permanent and
non-permanent members of the Security Council.
Article IX
The parties agree that they will support the adoption in
accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court
of a proposal specifically stating that knowing, intentional, and
deliberate violation of Articles I, II, or V of this treaty by a State
party will constitute a crime under that statute and that
individuals who violate or have responsibility for such violation,
by being in a position to exercise control over or direct the
actions of a state, may be prosecuted in accordance with the rules
of that court.
Article X
The parties agree that they will support the adoption in
accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court
of a proposal specifically stating that knowing, intentional, and
deliberate unauthorized transfer, or attempted transfer, of
nuclear weapons or proscribed materials and technology by any
individual to any individual or state will constitute a crime under
that Statute.
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Article XI
No party may terminate or withdraw from the obligations of
this treaty unless in accordance with the requirements of Articles
60, 61, 62, and other relevant provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the application of which may
be reviewed by the International Court of Justice.
Article XII
The terms of this treaty are not meant to be aspirational, but
self-executing and shall be considered as such by those judicial
and governing bodies called upon to interpret the treaty.
II. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND SECURITY COUNCIL PROVISIONS AND MOTIVATION FOR
NEW TREATY
As a preliminary matter, this author readily acknowledges
that proposed Articles VII and VIII, by not requiring a
unanimous vote, reflect an effort to circumvent the fact that the
Security Council has been in gridlock for years because of the
ability of any one of the Permanent Five to veto decisive action.
The result has been weak, lowest-common-denominator decision
making at best. The exact terms of these provisions, however, are
not absolutely critical, and they should not distract the reader
from looking at the totality of the concepts mentioned in the
proposed treaty. At the same time, they have been included
because this issue should be seriously discussed in any
negotiations on a new treaty. The international community has
sought to find some reasonable alternative to the obstacles
presented by the UN Charter’s Security Council veto provisions
since the adoption of the first United for Peace proposal in
1950.27 The terms of Articles VII and VIII of the proposed treaty
are consistent with at least the spirit of the insightful 2004 UN
Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
27. G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov.
3, 1950) (allowing the General Assembly to vote to take action when the Security
Council has been unable, due to lack of unanimity, to assume its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security).
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Change, which noted that “the veto has an anachronistic
character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly
democratic age.”28 Moreover, the idea of a Security Council
agreeing to action in the narrow non-proliferation arena without
a unanimous vote may not be as improbable as it might first
appear. The Permanent Five are all nuclear weapons states and
therefore are unlikely to be the targets of UN action for violating
this new treaty. Finally, the existing UN Charter does not legally
preclude these terms as the proposed non-proliferation treaty is a
separate document and can include any provisions agreed upon
by the parties.
The new treaty also formally acknowledges in Articles III
and IV the need for an organization similar to the current
informal Zangger Committee, which serves as a faithful
interpreter of the NPT by attempting to define specific items that
can produce special fissionable materials or that should trigger
safeguards if exported or manufactured.29 The treaty itself, of
course, cannot contain a list because technology evolves. The
Zangger Committee of thirty-seven states, many of which were
originally nuclear suppliers, has endeavored to keep up with the
technology and define potentially dangerous materials with the
understanding that some of these may be exported with
safeguards in pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy.30 The
committee’s work has been repeatedly referenced favorably
during the NPT review conferences with a consensus document
in 1995 stating that “[t]he conference notes that the application
by all States of the understandings of the Zangger Committee
would contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation
regime.”31 It follows that the proposed new treaty should
officially authorize and incorporate such a useful organization.
The larger question is why the NNWS should agree to this
treaty when they have one that apparently promises
28. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, ¶ 256, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
29. ZANGGER COMMITTEE and NPT, http://www.zanggercommittee.org/NPT/
Seiten/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). This is also known as the Nuclear
Exporters Committee.
30. Id.
31. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3 IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/482
(Aug. 23, 1995).
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disarmament. The basic answer is that the NWS will never
completely disarm for the many reasons already stated, and the
NPT has no enforcement mechanisms to insure disarmament,
non-proliferation, or peaceful uses of nuclear energy. What the
NNWS get in this treaty is what may be most important to them:
(1) a legal (versus rhetorical) promise of no first use with
possible criminal punishment for violation; (2) a strong
deterrent to an aggressive war designed to take over their
territory by the suggestion that nuclear weapons may be used by a
NWS for their defense in the event of such an invasion; (3)
concrete steps to insure non-proliferation of weapons, backed up
by enforcement provisions so that there is less likelihood that
nuclear weapons may be acquired by an unstable neighbor prone
to use them; and (4) a promise to facilitate peaceful uses of
nuclear energy with the ability to obtain compliance by seeking
redress through the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”),
ICJ, UN General Assembly, and UN Security Council. In short,
they would be exchanging an empty promise for enforceable
benefits. The NWS, on the other hand, would get exactly what
they want: a legal regime with clear procedures that could
actually prevent proliferation.
The NPT of 1968, and perhaps more generally the entire
edifice often termed as the non-proliferation regime, disregards
the fact that in the last century international law has developed in
a manner designed to encourage compliance with international
agreements and customary international law. These
developments occurred with the advent of international
institutions, some of which have been referenced above, and the
increasing incorporation of international law into the framework
of domestic and regional tribunals. The next section will review
some of these improvements with an eye to how they may
enhance the enforcement of the proposed non-proliferation
treaty.
III. ENFORCEMENT
In his article on the 2005 NPT review conference,
Chamundeeswari Kuppuswamy stated that the NPT is strong on
law but weak on enforcement.32 The same might be said of
32. Kuppuswamy, supra note 3, at 142.
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international law generally. Over the years an extensive body of
law has developed through the ratification of treaties,
recognition of the customary practice of nations, identification of
general legal principles, judicial and scholarly writings, and
adherence to fundamental norms common to all civilized
nations.33 But there is no judiciary with automatic jurisdiction
over disputes or a powerful executive to enforce the law. One
might wonder why states bother to comply with treaties and other
forms of international law at all. The answer lies in a series of
practical, and sometimes moral, judgments. Treaties contain
benefits for both parties, and states generally will not enter into
agreements with states that have a reputation for disregarding
still feasible obligations that have been accepted in prior treaties.
States that ignore treaties, customary law, general principles, and
fundamental norms can become pariah states and suffer
diplomatic and economic sanctions as well as internal pressure to
make good on their promises and adhere to standards of civilized
behavior. This is why England, in accordance with the
requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights,
would submit to the judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights and pay UK£40,000 to the families of slain IRA terrorists,34
why Russia paid US$300,000 to England after arbitration when its
fleet accidentally and understandably shelled English fishing
boats in the North sea during the Russo-Japanese war,35 and why
Norway abandoned its claims to Greenland based on a casual oral
commitment made by its foreign minister.36
In addition, in limited circumstances in certain countries,
international law may be incorporated into domestic law so that a
state’s judiciary and law enforcement authorities may enforce
international law at least within that states’ boundaries. Thus, as
early as the Spanish-American war, the US Supreme Court
applied recognized international laws of war to captured vessels37

33. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
34. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1996).
35. See Dogger Bank (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403, 403 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1905).
36. See Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Den. v. Nor.),
1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 55, at 158 (May 11).
37. Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712–15 (1900).

108 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:93

and later enforced domestically the general terms of a treaty
intended to prevent discrimination.38
But these principles, while helpful, obviously do not carry
enough weight and global force to insure that states and
individuals do not often violate international law with impunity.
There have been, of course, innumerable violations of the
Geneva Conventions,39 the Torture Convention,40 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights41 that have never been
legally prosecuted. The international community also never took
decisive legal action against Saddam Hussein or his advisers as
punishment for his 1980s nuclear program, attack on Iran, or
invasion of Kuwait; against Israel for its 1981 attack on Iraq’s
nuclear reactor; or against North Korea42 and Iran43 for their
repeated non-compliance with the requirements imposed by the
IAEA, despite the fact that all of these actions were in violation of
specific treaties or the UN Charter. This lack of enforcement is
due in part to that fact that the relevant treaties do not contain
provisions which take advantage of the many significant advances
in international law that have occurred in the twentieth century.
The proposed new NPT treaty regime does exactly that.
A. Arbitration
Article VI of the proposed treaty requires that any factual or
legal dispute as to whether a state is transferring weapons
technology, violating IAEA safeguards, acquiring weapons,
38. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
39. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
l949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, l949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
40. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
42. UN Declares N Korea in Nuclear Breach, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Feb. 13,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2751509.stm.
43. See Jacqueline Shire & David Albright, INST. FOR SCI. AND INT’L SEC., Iran’s NPT
Violations-Numerous and Possibly Ongoing?, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/
publications/iran/irannptviolations.pdf.
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refusing to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or
otherwise acting in violation of this treaty be first submitted to
the PCA in the Hague unless there is an emergency that would
not allow time for arbitration. As written, this is non-binding
arbitration, meaning that the parties do not have to accept as
final the panel’s findings but can seek redress through the other
organizations mentioned in the treaty.
The creation of the PCA was one of the most concrete
accomplishments of the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes.44 The PCA has, for the most
part, maintained a low profile since its founding and its work has
been largely unrecognized.45 But in reality, the PCA can be, and
has been in the past, an invaluable asset as a mechanism to
unravel complicated disagreements as well as to provide time for
rational thinking to prevail when there is an intense clash
between states. In 1905, Great Britain’s animosity towards Russia
turned into a clamor for war when the Russian fleet, as
referenced above, mistook English trawlers for Japanese torpedo
boats.46 But international agreement on a five-member
arbitration board, inspired by the creation of the PCA, acted as
an escape valve to divert public outcry.47 The panel sorted out the
facts, dispelled rumor, and found an acceptable resolution.48
More recently, in 1996 after war broke out between Eritrea and
Yemen over possession of the Hanish Islands, the PCA served as a
neutral arbiter to sift through the complicated history of the area
and determine rightful ownership.49 It is not unusual for the
parties to a treaty to foresee the potential for future quarrels and
to include mandatory arbitration in the document’s basic
provisions. Thus, when Libya signed concession agreements with
Texaco and other oil companies in 1955, the documents
contained arbitration clauses that were utilized to provide just
compensation when Libya nationalized private oil properties in
44. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, History, http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1044 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
45. See MARK JANIS & JOHN NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY
273 (2006).
46. See Dogger Bank (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403, 403 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1905).
47. Richard Lebow, Accidents and Crises: The Dogger Bank Affair, 31 NAVAL WAR C.
REV. 66, 70–73 (1978).
48. Id. at 72–73.
49. See Eri.-Yemen Arbitration, 40 I.L.M. 983 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999).
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1974.50 On a larger scale, the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) included various means to
arbitrate nautical disputes under the auspices of the PCA,51 and
the 1994 European Energy Charter Treaty contained similar
provisions.52 These terms have resulted in approximately twentyfour arbitration cases involving investors under the Energy
Charter53 and referral of five major cases related to UNCLOS.54
In light of the continuous disagreements pertaining to nuclear
proliferation and civilian use of nuclear power, it only follows
that the international community should routinely look to
arbitration as a first step in addressing disputes that may grow out
of a non-proliferation treaty.
B.

International Court of Justice

Non-binding arbitration is theoretically an informal
proceeding in which all parties seek to come together to find an
equitable solution. When arbitration does not succeed,
adversarial litigation often follows. Accordingly, Article VI of the
proposed treaty is structured to permit the parties to proceed to
the International Court of Justice if arbitration fails.
The ICJ was established under the UN Charter in 1946 to
interpret international law, serve as a fact finder, and assess
reparations in cases involving disputes between states.55 The
court may also give advisory opinions when requested by a UN
organization.56 An important first step is for the court to acquire
jurisdiction to decide a contested case. This can be obtained in
advance by the general consent of the parties,57 by special
agreement in a particular case or, as provided in proposed
Article VI, over “matters specifically provided for . . . in treaties

50. See Texaco Overseas Petrol. Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1, *5 (Int’l Ct. Arb. 1977).
51. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see also PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, Ad Hoc Arbitration
Under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1288 (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
52. See The Energy Charter Treaty art. 26, Dec. 12, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 382.
53. See ENERGY CHARTER, Investor-State Disputes, http://www.encharter.org/
index.php?id=213&L=l (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
54. See Ad Hoc Arbitration, supra note 51.
55. ICJ Statute, supra note 33, art. 36.
56. See id. art. 65.
57. See id. art. 36(2).
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and conventions.”58 The ICJ has been fairly active since its
inception, deciding such highly contested issues as sovereignty
over the Channel Islands59 and drilling rights in the North Sea.60
Parties to the NPT have recognized that the ICJ could
potentially be an extremely valuable tool in any non-proliferation
regime because “non compliance is a very grey area; it is not easy
to decide what amounts to non compliance.”61 It is perhaps even
more difficult to decide when one organization has been
assigned the role of adjudicator and enforcer, as is the case with
the Security Council in the NPT, as opposed to utilizing a
completely independent judicial body like the ICJ.62
Assigning the task of adjudication to the ICJ after an
adversarial hearing necessarily raises the important question of
burden of proof. One of the current problems in the NPT is the
demand by some for absolute proof when it is often impossible to
produce such evidence. As Perkovich and Acton state in their
treatise on nuclear disarmament:
Actually proving that a state has violated an agreement
can be very difficult and often takes time, no matter how
effective and well funded safeguards are. . . . Enhanced IAEA
safeguards are unlikely to inspire enough confidence . . .
unless the international community is willing to accept a
considerably lower standard for assessing evidence, such as
balance of probabilities rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.63

The burden of proof in civil cases is preponderance of the
evidence, which is very close to the “balance of probabilities”
referenced by Perkovich and Acton. Preponderance of the
evidence is generally defined as meaning that the fact is more
likely true than not true.64 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
only required in criminal cases that would result in the infliction
58. Id. art. 36(1).
59. See Miniquiers and Ecrehos, (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).
60. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
61. See Kuppuswamy supra note 3, at 147 (referring to the position of discussants at
the 2005 NPT review conference).
62. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 159 (citing George Perkovich and James M. Acton,
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Adelphi Paper 396, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A
DEBATE, supra note 5, at 107–08).
63. Perkovich & Acton, supra note 62, at 89–90.
64. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009).
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of punishment upon individual human beings as opposed to
general sanctions on corporate and state entities. Accordingly,
the burden of proof for the ICJ that has been included in
proposed Article VI is preponderance of the evidence.
According to the proposed treaty, the ICJ may be overruled
by a majority vote of the General Assembly or Security Council.65
Military action that would directly impose physical punishment
could only be authorized by a ninety percent vote of the Security
Council. It is expected that each state in the General Assembly or
Security Council would apply its own individual standards of
proof before voting on these matters. Clearly, such a procedure
would insure that severe punitive measures were not imposed
without substantial, convincing evidence to justify such actions.
The appeal and sanction mechanisms applied by proposed
Articles VII and VIII are extremely important to the ultimate goal
of enforcement. Currently, the UN Charter provides that ICJ
decisions may be enforced by the Security Council, which means
that if one of the permanent five members vetoes an action, the
decision is not enforced. This was the case after the ICJ ruled
against the United States for violating the sovereignty of
Nicaragua.66 Because of this and the previous concerns expressed
about the Permanent Five veto, the proposed treaty does not rely
upon unanimous Security Council approval to secure
enforcement of an ICJ judgment.67 The ICJ verdict is final unless
the losing party decides to appeal to the Security Council or
General Assembly. There is no lowest-common-denominator
decision making. To discourage frivolous appeals, the GA and SC
are authorized to not only overrule the ICJ judgment, but also
increase the fines, sanctions, or penalties. If the decision is not
overruled or modified by a majority vote of the GA or SC within
thirty days, it then goes into effect. If there is non-compliance
with the decision of the ICJ or modifications made by the GA and
SC, the Security Council may then take non-military action by
majority vote or utilize military force after a ninty percent vote if
the parties actions threaten international peace and security.
65. See supra Part I, art. VII.
66. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 147 (June 27); U.N. SCOR, 2718th mtg. at 51, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2718 (Oct.
28, 1986).
67. See supra Part I, art. VIII.
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C. International Criminal Court
Articles IX and X of the proposed treaty state that the
parties will support the adoption by the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) of amendments that make it an international
crime to transfer, receive, or manufacture nuclear weapons or
technology in violation of Articles I and II, to engage in first use
of nuclear weapons in violation of Article V, or to participate in
unauthorized transfer of nuclear material as outlined in Article
X.68 These provisions are vital to the enforcement regime
contained in the proposed treaty. Other commentators have also
recognized the potential use of the ICC against “illicit
proliferation of nuclear weapons and material”69 and first use of
nuclear weapons.70 The utilization of the ICC and its associated
criminal justice system is clearly the next logical step in antiproliferation efforts.
The vision of a UN-sponsored International Criminal Court
naturally followed from the success of the Nuremberg trials after
World War II.71 By the late 1940s, however, politicization of
virtually every UN effort, generated by the Cold War, prevented
the creation of such a tribunal. Progress was not made until the
conflict began to dissipate in the Reagan-Bush-Gorbachev era.72
In 1989, the United Nations International Law Commission was
asked to draft the Charter for the ICC.73 By 1998, the Rome
Statute detailing the rules and procedures of the Court had been
adopted.74 The United States had a major role in drafting these
procedures, but because of conservative concerns about possible
politically motivated prosecutions of US officials,75 the United
States is not one of the 111 states that have ratified the Rome

68. See supra Part I, arts. IX–X.
69. Nelson, supra note 4, at 164 (quoting Perkovich & Acton, supra note 62, at 135).
70. See Han & Kim, supra note 18, at 250 (quoting David Krieger, Nuremberg and
Nuclear Weapons, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUNDATION, http://www.wagingpeace.org/
articles/1996/00/00_krieger_nuremberg.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010)).
71. Ron Sievert, A New Perspective on the International Criminal Court; Why the Right
Should Embrace the ICC and How America Can Use It, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 77, 93 (2006).
72. Id.
73. G.A. Res. 44/39, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/39 (Dec. 4, 1989).
74. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
75. Sievert, supra note 71, at 95.
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Statute by 2009.76 The United States has reengaged with the ICC
during the Obama administration, sending a delegation led by
Ambassador Stephen Rapp to the 2010 negotiations on defining
the crime of aggression.77
The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity78 “committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”79 In
addition, the Statute provides for amendments dictating new
crimes to be adopted by the parties seven years after the initial
ratification.80 Currently, the Assembly of States parties is working
on adding the crime of aggression or aggressive war to the list of
substantive crimes.81
The ICC incorporates the key Nuremberg principle that
individuals, not just states as abstract entities, are responsible for
the commission of international crimes.82 The concept of
command responsibility is embedded in the proposed treaty by
the language stating that individuals “in a position to exercise
control over or direct the actions of a state” may be prosecuted.83
The international community had applied these principles
during the International Criminal Trial for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) trial of Slobodan Milošević84 and the
proceedings against Augusto Pinochet,85 and the ICC has carried
them forward with the indictment of Sudan President Omar alBashir.86

76. United Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-10.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
77. Blake Evans-Pritchard & Simon Jennings, US Takes Cautious Steps Towards ICC,
INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, May 6, 2010, http://iwpr.net/report-news/us-takescautious-steps-towards-icc.
78. Rome Statute, supra note 74, arts. 6–8.
79. Id. art. 7.
80. Id. art. 123.
81. See Evans-Pritchard & Jennings, supra note 77; see also ROGER CLARK, THE
REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1
(2010).
82. Rome Statute, supra note 74, art. 28; see also Sievert, supra note 71, at 93.
83. See supra Part I, art. IX
84. Marlise Simons, Milosevic Now Faces Genocide Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002,
at A10.
85. Bringing the General to Justice, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1998, at 23.
86. Marlise Simons et al., Arrest is Sought of Sudan Leader in Genocide Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A1.
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Although the proposed treaty requires that the parties
support the adoption by the ICC of a substantive law
criminalizing the first use of nuclear weapons absent self-defense,
it is arguable that the court may already have jurisdiction over
such an attack. When asked for an advisory opinion about the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the ICJ could not exclude
their use in self-defense,87 but noted that many argue that
otherwise “nuclear weapons would in all circumstances be unable
to draw any distinction between the civilian population and
combatants, or between civilian objects and military objectives.”88
The ICC prohibits crimes against humanity, and under the rules
of international humanitarian law, such indiscriminate killing of
civilians is prohibited.89 Nevertheless, specifically including first
use, along with unauthorized transfer, receipt, and manufacture
of proscribed nuclear material and weapons as substantive
crimes, will insure there is no dispute as to the illegality of the
actions.
When leaders understand they can be held responsible for
their decisions by a body such as the ICC, there can be a major
deterrent to reckless actions. Professor John Norton Moore and
others have noted that abuses take place when “regime elites,”
usually within non-democratic governments that are not
controlled by the people, engage in aggressive behavior with the
knowledge that there is no “system wide deterrence.”90 “Leaders
can externalize the costs of their high-risk behavior by placing it
on their own people and neighbors and internalize the benefits
because there is no one to hold them accountable.”91 Because of
the ICTY, Spanish and English Courts, and the ICC, Pinochet,
Milosevic, and al-Bashir found that this is no longer possible. This
is why it is critical that the proposed treaty take advantage of the
opportunities created by the newly established ICC.

87. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 261–63 (July 8).
88. Id. at 262.
89. Han & Kim, supra note 18, at 248.
90. John N. Moore, Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations
Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 811, 840–41 (1997).
91. Sievert, supra note 71, at 86.
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D. War of Aggression
Article V prohibits the use of nuclear weapons unless in
reaction to another’s first use or response to another state’s
initiation of aggressive war in violation of the UN Charter.92 No
one questions that nuclear weapons may be employed after they
have been used by an adversary. Authorizing use in response to
an aggressive war in which the enemy has not used nuclear
weapons would be far more controversial. In this author’s
opinion, however, a commitment never to use nuclear weapons
to combat a conventional attack would essentially invite a state
with a large population and army to invade another that has
fewer resources. States that have acted in the past to protect
others, like the United States in South Korea and Kuwait, would
have to maintain a huge military to be able to counter states like
China and Russia, which can deploy a million soldiers in an
attack. As it stands today, the US military has been strained to the
limit simply maintaining 200,000 troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan.93 As noted earlier, nuclear weapons have very likely
prevented wars and it would be folly to abandon that deterrence.
Any policy statements to the contrary are asking for trouble.94
There naturally would be significant debate as to what
constitutes a war of aggression. The goal is to find words that
would legally prohibit something like Hitler’s attack on Poland,
Japan’s occupation of the Philippines and Southeast Asia, or
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, while making room for an allied
invasion of France to reverse the consequences of Nazi tyranny; a
US attack on Iraq based on violations of numerous UN
resolutions and Saddam’s genocide against over 100,000 Shiites

92. Id. at 127.
93. See John D. Banusiewicz, Petraeus Explains Afghanistan Strategy, AM. FORCES
PRESS
SERV.,
Sept.
03,
2010,
http://www.defense.gov//News/
NewsArticle.aspx?ID=60737; Alexandra Hemmerly-Brown, Iraq Reaches New Dawn, Ends
Combat Operations, ARMY NEWS SERV., Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/
08/31/44509-iraq-reaches-new-dawn-ends-combat-operations/index.html?ref=homeheadline-title5.
94. See Clinton, supra note 11. Clinton’s statements come close to this assertion,
noting that the United States’ Nuclear Posture Review determined not to use nuclear
weapons against NNWS in compliance with NPT. At least this would not apply to China,
North Korea, and Russia.
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and Kurds;95 Israel’s attacks against Lebanon, and possibly even
Germany’s moves into Norway and Italy in what some might call
strategic self-defense.96 In addition, provision should be allowed
for humanitarian intervention where needed in states like
Rwanda and Sudan.
This author believes the motivation for an attack should be a
major factor in determining if military action amounts to an
aggressive war. When one state invades another with intent to
occupy it and exploit its resources, as with Germany’s attacks on
France, Poland, and the oil fields of Eastern Europe, that is
clearly aggressive war. The United States, however, has never
demonstrated intent to permanently occupy and exploit Iraq and
Afghanistan (and of course has sought to return those states to
democratic self-governance as soon as possible). Accordingly,
these actions should not be labeled aggressive war. It is
recognized, however, that it is not always easy to determine intent
at the moment of invasion.
Fortunately, the ICC Review Conference in Kampala, after
seven years of negotiation, recently adopted an international
definition of aggression.97 Although perhaps not technically
perfect, it is both practical and reasonable and can be utilized in
interpreting proposed Article V’s provision permitting use of
nuclear weapons in response to first use or a war of aggression. It
provides that a state commits the crime of aggression when it
uses armed force to commit acts of aggression “against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another state or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations.”98 Two paragraphs of
“understandings” annexed to the resolution then assert that this
is meant to cover acts that by their “character, gravity and scale”
95. Claus Kress, The German Chief Federal Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Investigate the
Alleged Crime of Preparing Aggression Against Iraq, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 245, 261–64
(2004).
96. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 211–12 (1994).
Germany maintained that the invasion of Norway was necessary to preempt England’s
planned invasion of Norway to block iron ore shipments from Sweden to Germany. Postwar documents confirmed England’s planned operations in Norway.
97. See ICC Review Conference, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res.7, annex I,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf.
98. See id. at 2 (referencing provision 8bis(2)).
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are “manifest violation[s] of the Charter.”99 This is followed by a
list of acts in Resolution 3314 which qualify as aggression such as
invasion, annexation, bombardment, blockade, and attack on the
armed forces of another state.100 The proposed definition
includes further conditions such as a finding of aggression by the
Security Council in advance of ICC proceedings if the Security
Council submits the charge or dismissal of proceedings initiated
by the prosecutor or another State if the Security Council
affirmatively moves to block the charges.101 Accordingly, where
the complaint is referred by another State or the prosecutor on
his own, a Security Council veto by one nation alone could not
interfere with the proceedings. Prosecution for the crime of
aggression can be initiated against those “in a position effectively
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State” if they were involved in “the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution . . . of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”102
Despite the challenges interpreting legal terms, it will not
always be difficult to recognize an illegal war of aggression that
justifies the use of nuclear weapons in response under the
proposed new NPT. As Professor Roger Clark stated at an ICC
conference on defining the crime:
At Nuremberg and Tokyo there was no great need to define
what was meant by aggression. It was sufficient to adopt
something like Justice Stewart’s approach to dirty books.
That is to say, we know that disgusting stuff when we see it,
and in particular that is what the Germans and Japanese had
done.103

The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression will
now, however, put what we may have been able to viscerally
perceive when it happened in the past into black and white legal
99. Id. annex III, at 6. Article 51 of the UN Charter authorizes use of force in selfdefense and Article 55 calls for observance of fundamental human rights.
100. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
101. See ICC Review Conference, supra note 97, annex I, at 3–4 (referencing
provisions 15bis and 15ter).
102. Id. annex I, at 2 (referencing Article 8bis (1)).
103. Roger S. Clark, Delegate from Western Samoa to the ICC, Justice Without
Borders: the International Criminal Court, in 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 90, 91 (2003).

2010] A NEW NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

119

terms that should be understood by all the nations of the world.
The result will hopefully be to deter aggression by telling leaders
that not only are their states subject to nuclear attack, but they
personally are subject to criminal prosecution, if they engage in
such military offensives against sovereign states.
E.

Self-Execution and Extraterritoriality

Article XII of the proposed treaty states that the provisions
will be “self-executing” as opposed to aspirational. This phrase is
included to add another mechanism to assist in the enforcement
of the treaty as it would permit domestic courts to implement the
treaty within their jurisdiction.
Although many states incorporate international treaties as
the law of the land, some follow the US model established by
Chief Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson to the effect that a treaty
“operates of itself” only when it is clear that its terms do not
require additional domestic legislation to activate its provisions
for application by domestic courts.104 An excellent case
explaining this concept is the decision of the Supreme Court of
California in Sei Fujii v. California.105 In its opinion, the court
analyzed the UN Charter to determine whether the Charter’s
general non-discrimination provisions were self-executing and
could thus be utilized by Japanese challenging the California
alien land law.106 The Court stated:
In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts
look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by
the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is
uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances
surrounding its execution. . . . In order for a treaty provision
to operate without the aid of implementing legislation and
to have the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that
the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule that,
standing alone, would be enforceable in the courts.
It is clear that the provisions of the preamble and of
Article 1 of the charter which are claimed to be in conflict
with the alien land law are not self-executing. They state
104. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds by U.S.
v. Percheman, 31 U.S. 51 (1833).
105. Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (in bank).
106. Id. at 619–20.
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general purposes and objectives of the United Nations
Organization and do not purport to impose legal obligations
on the individual member nations or to create rights in
private persons. It is equally clear that none of the other
provisions relied on by plaintiff is self-executing. Article 55
declares that the United Nations ‘shall promote: . . .
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion,’ and in Article 56, the member
nations ‘pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55.’ Although the member
nations have obligated themselves to cooperate with the
international organization in promoting respect for, and
observance of, human rights, it is plain that it was
contemplated that future legislative action by the several
nations would be required to accomplish the declared
objectives, and there is nothing to indicate that these
provisions were intended to become rules of law for the
courts of this country upon the ratification of the charter.
The language used in Articles 55 and 56 is not the type
customarily employed in treaties which have been held to be
self-executing and to create rights and duties in individuals.

....
It is significant to note that when the framers of the
charter intended to make certain provisions effective without
the aid of implementing legislation they employed language
which is clear and definite and manifests that intention. For
example, Article 104 provides: ‘The Organization shall enjoy
in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as
may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfillment of its purposes.’ Article 105 provides: ‘1. The
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the
Members of the United Nations and officials of the
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of
their functions in connection with the Organization.’ In
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Curran v. City of New York, these articles were treated as
being self-executory.107

There is a potential conflict between proposed Article IV of
the proposed “self-executing” treaty in which the parties agree to
“facilitate to the fullest extent the transfer of technology for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy”108 and the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 that requires Congress to approve all such transactions after
being assured of safeguards.109 If there is an actual conflict, a selfexecuting treaty would prevail under the last in time rule.110 In
practice, however, as the transfer would only take place in
accordance with the conditions, procedures, and safeguards
mandated by the new Nuclear Export Committee and the IAEA,
it is expected that the basic technical conditions required by
Congress will be met. On the other hand, a self-executing treaty
may eliminate Congress’s ability to refuse to provide peaceful
technology simply because it does not view a foreign state as
cooperative or as an ally.
Not all states adhere to a view of treaty law that requires a
demonstrated intent that an international agreement be selfexecuting before its terms can become operational in a domestic
court. Germany, for example, follows a “systemic approach,”
which, according to Eyal Benvenisti,
has been particularly helpful in constructing a global world
view of law that delimits national sovereignty and governs
inter-state relations. . . . The systemic view organizes . . . legal
obligations arranged within a certain hierarchy and legal
coherence. . . . A recent trend in international law
scholarship, particularly in the United States, challenges this
view, offering international law as no more than a mix of
solitary treaties hovering over the abyss of international
anarchy with no particular hierarchy. . . . Under this view,
state sovereignty reigns supreme.111

It is because of the competing views reflected in Benvenisti’s
reference to the US approach that it is important to make clear
that the terms of the proposed treaty are intended to be self107. Id. at 620–22 (citations omitted).
108. See supra Part I, art. IV.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (2009).
110. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
111. Eyal Benvenisti, The Conception of International Law as a Legal System, 50
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 393, 394–95 (2007).
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executing. All domestic courts may then enforce its provisions in
matters that fall within their jurisdiction without further
implementing legislation.
It is interesting to observe that the jurisdiction of domestic
courts is not necessarily confined to what occurs within that
state’s boundaries but may be applied extraterritorially.112 Under
the “effects” doctrine, a state “may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders.”113 Pursuant to “passive
personality” jurisdiction, a state may punish acts that injure its
citizens who are outside its territory.114 The “protective principle”
allows a state to address conduct outside its territory that
threatens its security or governmental operations.115 Finally, the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction allows a state to take action to
punish certain crimes against mankind regardless of the
nationality of the victims or effect on the state. This has been
applied to genocide, war crimes, torture,116 piracy, and acts of
terrorism.117 Potentially violations of the new NPT might easily fit
within one of these categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Cases can generally be brought before domestic courts by
any party that has standing because it has suffered injury as a
result of violations of the treaty, though the rules of standing vary
in each state. There would probably be a significant number of
plaintiffs who could conceivably claim injury as a result of
violations of the new NPT. One trend that could be effective in
enforcing aspects of the proposed NPT is the recent recognition
in Europe of non-governmental organizations, such as Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as parties who have
standing in lawsuits. This is because of their role as (selfappointed) guardians of certain constituencies.118 Regardless of
the status of the plaintiff, the goal is an NPT that is enforceable.
The combination of a self-executing treaty with effects, passive
112. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 45, at 778–79.
113. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945),
superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2009).
114. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 31 (Sept. 7).
115. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 936 (1968).
116. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–40 (2d Cir. 1998).
117. United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 681–82 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
118. See Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30
HARV. INT’L L.J. 393, 394 (1989).
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personality, protective, and universal jurisdiction has unlimited
potential to create new forums to insure the treaty is enforced.
CONCLUSION
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 includes as a
fundamental part of the bargain between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states a promise to abolish nuclear weapons.
Realistically, the United States and other nuclear weapons states
will never completely meet this commitment. As long as it has not
been met, the non-nuclear weapons states will have an excuse to
engage in activities that lead to proliferation. The goal should be
no loose nukes, no nascent nukes, no new nuclear weapons
states, and no use of nuclear weapons. This can be accomplished
by drafting an honest new treaty that recognizes the reality that at
least some of the nuclear weapons states will always maintain a
certain number of nuclear weapons, while promising no first use
absent aggression and guaranteeing the development of peaceful
nuclear energy. Most importantly, this treaty can be constructed
in a way that it can be actually enforced through reliance on
mechanisms that have evolved in twentieth century international
law such as the PCA, ICJ, and ICC, combined with modifications
to insure in this realm an effective General Assembly and Security
Council. The world should not continue to provide lip service to
the false promises of the 1968 NPT, nor can it afford to
complacently tolerate in this area a largely ineffective United
Nations. This Article presents concrete ideas that could establish
a clear, realistic path towards non-proliferation. This author
hopes they will serve as the basis for productive discussions in the
future that will lead to an enforceable non-proliferation regime.

